Abstract. First Order Logic (FOL) is a powerful reasoning tool for program verification. Recent work on Ivy shows that FOL is well suited for verification of parameterized distributed systems. However, specifying many natural objects, such as a ring topology, in FOL is unexpectedly inconvenient. We present a framework based on FOL for specifying distributed multi-process protocols in a process-local manner together with an implicit network topology. In the specification framework, we provide an auto-active analysis technique to reason about the protocols locally, in a process-modular way. Our goal is to mirror the way designers often describe and reason about protocols. By hiding the topology behind the FOL structure, we simplify the modelling, but complicate the reasoning. To deal with that, we use an oracle for the topology to develop a sound and relatively complete proof rule that reduces reasoning about the implicit topology back to pure FOL. This completely avoids the need to axiomatize the topology. Using the rule, we establish a property that reduces verification to a fixed number of processes bounded by the size of local neighbourhoods. We show how to use the framework on two examples, including leader election on a ring.
Introduction
Auto-active [6] and automated verification engines are now commonly used to analyze the behavior of safety-and system-critical multi-process distributed systems. Applying the analysis techniques early in the design cycle has the added advantage that any errors or bugs found are less costly to fix than if one waits until the system is deployed. Therefore, it is typical to seek a proof of safety for parametric designs, where the number of participating program components is not yet determined, but the inter-process communciation fits a given pattern, as is common in routing or communication protocols, and other distributed systems.
Recently, Ivy [15] has been introduced as a novel auto-active verification technique (in the style of Dafny [6] for reasoning about parameterized systems. Ivy models protocols in First Order Logic (FOL). The verification conditions are compiled (with user help) to a decidable fragment of FOL, called Effectively Propositional Reasoning (EPR) [16] . Ivy is automatic in the sense that the verification engineer only provides an inductive invariant. Furthermore, unlike Dafny, it guarantees that the verification is never stuck inside the decision procedure (verification conditions are decidable).
One of the disadvantages of Ivy is that an engineer must formally specify the entire protocol, including the topology. For instance, in verifying the leader election on a ring, Ivy requires an explicit axiomatization of the ring topology, ∀x, y, z · btw (x, y, z) ⇒ btw (y, z, x) ∀w, x, y, z · btw (w, x, y) ∧ btw (w, y, z) ⇒ btw (w, x, z) ∀w, x, y · btw (w, x, y) ⇒ ¬btw (w, y, x) ∀w, x, y · distinct (w, x, y) ⇒ (btw (w, x, y) ∨ btw (w, y, x)) ∀a, b · (next (a, b) ⇐⇒ ∀x · x = a ∧ x = b ⇒ btw (a, b, x)) Fig. 1 : A description of a unidirectional ring in FOL as presented by Ivy [15] .
as shown in Fig. 1 . The predicate btw (x, y, z) means that a process y is between processes x and z in the ring; similarly, next(a, b) means that b is an immediate neighbour of a on the ring. All (finite) rings satisfy the axioms in Fig. 1 . The converse is not true in general. For instance, take the rationals Q and let btw (x, y, z) be defined as x < y < z ∨ y < z < x ∨ z < x < y. All axioms of btw are satisfied, but the only consistent interpretation of next is an empty set. This satisfies all the axioms, but does not define a ring. For the axioms in Fig. 1 , all finite models of btw and next describe rings. This is not an issue for Ivy, since infinite models do not need to be considered for EPR. Such reasoning is nontrivial and is a burden on the verification engineer. As another example, we were not able to come up with an axiomatization of rings of alternating red and black nodes (shown in Fig. 2a ) within EPR. In general, a complete axiomatization of the topology might be hard to construct.
In this paper, we propose to address this problem by specifying the topology independently of process behaviour. We present a framework which separates the two and provides a clean way to express the topology. We then specify our transitions locally, as this is a natural and common way to define protocols. Once these preliminaries are done, we provide a process-local proof rule to verify properties of the system. To generate the proof rule, we offload topological knowledge to an oracle that can answer questions about the topology. Finally, we prove various properties of the proof rule.
In summary, the paper makes the following contributions. First, in Sec. 3, we show how to model protocols locally in FOL. This is an alternative to the global modelling used in Ivy. Second, in Sec. 4, we show a proof rule with verification conditions (VC) in FOL, which are often in EPR. When the VC is in EPR, this gives an engineer a mechanical check of inductiveness. This allows reasoning about topology without axiomatizing it. Third, in Sec. 5, we show that our proof rule (a) satisfies a small model property, and (b) is relatively complete. The first guarantees the verification can be done on small process domains; the second ensures that our proof rule is fairly expressive.
We illustrate our approach on two examples. First, as a running example, motivated by [12] , is a protocol on rings of alternating red and black nodes. These rings have only rotational symmetry, however, they have substantial local symmetry [7, 11, 12] consisting of two equivalence classes, one of red nodes, and one of black nodes. Second, in Sec. 6, we consider a modified version of the leader election protocol from Ivy [15] . This is of particular interest, since the local symmetry of [7, 11, 12] has not been applied to leader election. We thus extend [7, 11, 12] by both allowing more symmetries and infinite-state systems.
Preliminaries
FOL syntax and semantics. We assume some familiarity with the standard concepts of many sorted First Order Logic (FOL). A signature Σ consists of sorted predicates, functions, and constants. Terms are variables, constants, or (recursively) k-ary functions applied to k other terms of the correct sort. For every k-ary predicate P and k terms t 1 , . . . , t k of the appropriate sort for P , the formula P (t 1 , . . . , t k ) is a well-formed formula (wff). Wffs are then boolean combinations of formulae and universally or existentially quantified formulae. Namely, if ψ and ϕ are wffs, then so are (ψ ∧ ϕ), (ψ ∨ ϕ),(¬ψ), (ψ ⇒ ϕ),(ψ ⇐⇒ ϕ), (∀x · ψ), and (∃x · ψ). A variable x in a formula ψ is bound if it appears under the scope of a quantifier. A variable not bound is free. A wff with no free variables is called a sentence. For convenience, we often drop unnecessary parenthesis, and use ⊤ to denote true and ⊥ to denote false.
An FOL interpretation I over a domain D assigns every k-ary predicate P a sort-appropriate semantic interpretation I(P ) : D k → {T, F }; to every kary function f a sort-appropriate interpretation I(f ) : D k → D, and to every constant c an element I(c) ∈ D. Given an interpretation I and a sentence ψ, then either ψ is true in I (denoted, I |= ψ), or ψ is false in I (denoted I |= ψ). The definition of the models relation is defined on the structure of the formula as usual, for example, I |= (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff I |= ϕ and I |= ψ.
We write I(Σ ′ ) to denote a restriction of an interpretation I to a signature Σ ′ ⊆ Σ. Given disjoint signatures Σ,Σ ′ and corresponding interpretations I, I
′ over a fixed domain D, we define I ⊕ I ′ to be an interpretation of Σ ∪ Σ ′ over domain D defined such that (I ⊕ I ′ )(t) = I(t) if t ∈ Σ, and (I ⊕ I ′ )(t) = I ′ (t) if t ∈ Σ ′ . Given interpretation I and sub-domain D ′ ⊆ D where D ′ contains all constants, we let I(D ′ ) be the interpretation restricted to domain D ′ . FOL modulo structures We use an extension of FOL to describe structures, namely graphs. In this case, the signature Σ is extended with some pre-defined functions and predicates, and the interpretations are restricted to particular intended interpretations of these additions to the signature. We identify a structure class C with its signature Σ C and an intended interpretation. We write FOL C for First Order Logic over the structure class C. Common examples are FOL over strings, FOL over trees, and other finite structures.
A structure S = (D, I) is an intended interpretation I for structural predicates/functions Σ C over an intended domain D. A set of structures is denoted C. The syntax of FOL C is given by the syntax for FOL with signature Σ ⊎Σ C (where Σ is an arbitrary disjoint signature). For semantics, any F OL interpretation I of signature Σ leads to an F OL C interpretation I ⊕ I S of the signature Σ ⊎ Σ C . We write |= C ϕ iff every F OL C interpretation I satisfies I |= ϕ. We introduce a process sort Proc and require the intended domain D to be exactly the set of Proc-sorted elements, so that we put our intended structure on the processes. First Order Transition Systems. We use First Order Transitions Systems from Ivy [15, 14] . While the original definition was restricted to the EPR fragment of FOL, we do not require this. A transition system is a tuple T r = (S, S 0 , R), where S is a set of states, S 0 ⊆ S is a set of initial states, and R ⊆ S × S is a transition relation. A trace π is a (finite or infinite) sequence of states π = s 0 · · · s i · · · such that s 0 ∈ S 0 and for every 0 ≤ i < |π|, (s i , s i+1 ) ∈ R, where |π| denotes the length of π, or ∞ if π is infinite. A transition system may be augmented with a set B ⊆ S of "bad" states. The system is safe iff all traces contain no bad states. A set of states I is inductive iff S 0 ⊆ I and if s ∈ I and (s, s ′ ) ∈ R, then s ′ ∈ I. Showing the existence of an inductive set I that is disjoint from bad set B suffices to show a transition system is safe. A First-Order Transition System Specification (FOTSS) is a tuple (Σ, ϕ 0 , τ ) where Σ is an FOL signature, ϕ 0 is a sentence over Σ and τ is a sentence over Σ ⊎ Σ ′ , where ⊎ denotes disjoint union and
The semantics of a FOTSS are given by First Order Transition Systems (FOTS). Let D be a fixed domain. A FOTSS (Σ, ϕ 0 , τ ) defines a FOTS over D as follows: S = {I | I is an FOL interpretation over D}, S 0 = {I ∈ S | I |= ϕ 0 }, and R =
We may augment a FOTSS with a FOL sentence Bad , giving bad states in the FOTS by I ∈ B iff I Bad . A FOTSS is safe if all of its corresponding FOTS T r are safe, and is unsafe otherwise. That is, an FOTSS is unsafe if there exists at least one FOTS corresponding to it that has at least one execution that reaches a bad state. A common way to show a FOTSS is safe is to give a formula Inv such that |= ϕ 0 ⇒ Inv and |= Inv ∧ τ ⇒ Inv ′ . Then for any FOTS over domain D, the set I ⊆ S given by I = {I ∈ S | I |= Inv } is an inductive set, and |= Inv ⇒ ¬Bad then suffices to show that the state sets I, B in the FOTS are disjoint. Finding an invariant Inv satisfying the above proves the system safe. where U nch(Even, +, 1) means that Even, +, and 1 have identical interpretations in the pre-and post-states of τ .
Our intention is to model a program that starts with an even number in a variable var and increments var by 2 at every transition. It is an error if var ever becomes odd. A natural invariant to conjecture is Inv Even(var). However, since the signature is uninterpreted, the FOTSS does not model our intention.
For example, let D = {0, 1, 2}, I 0 (Even) = {1, 2}, I 0 (1) = 1, I 0 (+)(a, b) = a + b mod 3, and I 0 (var) = 1. Thus, I 0 |= ϕ 0 . Let I 1 be the same as I 0 , except I 1 (var) = 0. Then, I 0 ⊕ I ′ 1 |= τ and I 1 |= Bad . Thus, this FOTSS is unsafe.
One way to explicate our intention in Example 1 is to axiomatize the uninterpreted functions and relations in FOL as part of ϕ 0 and τ . Another alternative is to restrict their interpretation by restricting the interpretation of FOL to a particular structure. This is the approach we take in this paper. We define a First-Order (relative to C) Transition System Specification (FOCTSS).
We need to be able to talk about the structural objects in Σ C , and so we require that every FOCTSS (Σ, ϕ 0 , τ ) be an FOTSS with Σ C ⊆ Σ. Once we have these structural objects, any structure (D, I) ∈ C gives a FOCTS with states I where I(Σ C ) = I C , initial states I where I |= ϕ 0 , transitions (I 1 , I 2 ) where I 1 ⊕ I ′ 2 |= τ , and bad states I for which I |= Bad .
First-Order Protocols
We introduce the notion of a First-Order Protocol (FOP) to simplify and restrict specifications in a FOTS. We choose restrictions to make our protocols asynchronous compositions of processes over static network topologies. Each process description is relative to its process neighbourhood. For example, a process operating on a ring has access to its immediate left and right neighbours, and transitions are restricted to these processes. This simplifies the modelling.
We begin with formalizing the concept of a network topology. As a running example, consider a Red-Black-Ring (RBR) topology, whose instance with 4 processes is shown in Fig. 2a . Processes are connected in a ring of alternating Red and Black processes. Each process is connected to two neighbours using two links, labelled left and right , respectively. From the example it is clear how to extend this topology to rings of arbitrary even size.
To formalize this, we assume that there is a unique sort Proc for processes.
T to be a topological signature, where Σ C E is a set of unary Proc-sorted functions and Σ C T is a set of distinct k-ary Proc-sorted predicates (k fixed). Functions in Σ C E correspond to communication edges, such as left and right in our example. Predicates in Σ C T correspond to classes of processes, such as Red and Black in our example. For simplicity, we assume that all classes have the same arity k. We often omit k from the signature when it is contextually clear. We are now ready to define the concept of a network topology: Definition 1. A network topology C over a topological signature Σ C is a collection of directed graphs G = (V, E) augmented with an edge labelling dir :
Given a node p in a graph G = (V, E) from a network topology C, the neighbourhood of p is defined as nbd (p) = {p} ∪ {q | (p, q) ∈ E}, and a neighbourhood of a tuple
Given the signatures Σ C T and Σ C E , the intended interpretation of a predicate P ∈ Σ C T is the set of all nodes in the network topology labelled by P , and the intended interpretation of a function
Each graph G in a network topology C provides a possible intended interpretation for the sort of processes Proc, and the edge and node labelling provide the intended interpretation for predicates and functions in Σ C .
Example 2. For our running example, consider an informal description of the protocol shown in Fig. 2b described by a set of guarded commands. The protocol is intended to be executed on the RBR topology shown in Fig. 2a . Initially, all processes start with their state variable var set to a special constant null. Then, at each step, a non-deterministically chosen process, sends a color to its right. Every black process sends a red color r, and every red process sends a black color b. It is bad if a Red process ever gets a black color.
To formalize the topology, for each n > 1, let ⊓ ⊔ Note that any set of graphs G with an upper bound on the out-degree of any vertex can be given a finite labelling according to the above. First-Order Protocols. Once we have specified the topology, we want to establish how processes transition. We define the syntax and semantics of a protocol.
A protocol signature Σ is a disjoint union of a topological signature Σ C , a state signature Σ S , and a background signature Σ B . Recall that all functions and relations in Σ C are of sort Proc. All elements of Σ S have arity of at least 1 with the first and only the first argument of sort Proc. Elements of Σ B do not allow arguments of sort Proc at all. Intuitively, elements of Σ C describe how processes are connected, elements of Σ S describe what is true in the current state of some process, and elements of Σ B provide background theories, such as laws of arithmetic and uninterpreted functions.
For an interpretation I, and a set of processes P ⊆ I(P roc), we write I(Σ S )(P ) for the interpretation I(Σ S ) restricted to processes in P . Intuitively, we look only at the states of P and ignore the states of all other processes.
, where Σ is a protocol signature; p is a free variable of sort Proc, Init(p) is a formula with k free variables p of sort Proc; M od(p) is a set of terms {t(p) | t ∈ dir (E)} ∪ {p}; T rLoc(p) is a formula over the signature Σ ∪ Σ ′ , and C is a network topology. Furthermore, Init(p) is of the form P ∈ΣT (P (p) ⇒ Init P (p)), where the arity of P is |p|, and each Init P is a formula over Σ \ Σ C (an initial state described without reference to topology for each relevant topological class); and terms of sort Proc occurring in TrLoc(p) are a subset of Mod (p). A formal description of our running example is given in Figure 3 as a FOprotocol. We define the signature including Σ C = {left , right , Red, Black }, the initial states Init (p) in the restricted form, and modification set Mod (p), where we allow processes to only write to their local neighbourhood. Next we specify two kinds of transitions, a red t r and a black t b transition. Each writes to their right neighbour the colour they expect that process to be. Each process p does not change the var states of p, left (p) ∈ Mod (p). Finally, we specify our local transitions TrLoc(p) by allowing each of the sub-transitions. Note that all process-sorted terms in TrLoc(p) are in Mod (p) = {left (p), p, right (p)}, and we are allowed to call on topological predicates in TrLoc, finishing our specification.
Furthermore, note that the semantic local neighbourhood nbd (p) and the set of syntactic terms in M od(p) have been connected. Namely, for every edge (p, q) ∈ E, there is a term t(p) ∈ M od(p) to refer to q, and for every term t(p) ∈ M od(p), we will refer to some process in the neighbourhood of p.
The semantics of a protocol P are given be an FOCTSS as shown in Fig. 4 . The protocol signature Σ is the same in the FOCTSS as in the FOP. Initially, ϕ 0 requires that all k-tuples of a given topology satisfy a topology-specific initial state. Finally, to take a transition τ , some process takes a local transition TrLoc(p) modifying states of processes that can be described using the terms in Mod (p). U nch(y) guarantees that the transition does not affect local state of processes that are outside of Mod (p). Finally, U nM od makes all functions and predicates in the background signature retain their interpretation during the transition. Overall, this describes a general multiprocess asynchronous protocol.
This definition of a FO-protocol places some added structure on the notion of FOTSS. It restricts how transition systems can be specified, which might seem like a drawback. On the contrary, the added structure provides two benefits. First, it removes the need for axiomatizing the network topology, since the topology is given semantically by C. Second, the system guarantees to model asynchronous composition of processes whose local transition relation is given by TrLoc -a common framework for specifying and reasoning about protocols.
To show safety of such a system, we will be concerned with invariants which only discuss a few processes, say Inv (p) where p = p 1 , . . . , p k . Then our FOinvariants will be of the form ∀p · Inv (p), and substituting ϕ 0 into our background, we find a natural check for when a given formula is inductive:
Indeed, by unpacking definitions, one sees that |= C InvOk means that every state on any trace of a FOCTS satisfies ∀p · Inv(p), and thus it suffices to check that |= C ∀p · Inv (p) ⇒ ¬Bad to prove safety. We, however, will focus on the task of verifying a candidate formula as inductive or not.
To decide if a candidate is inductive or not requires reasoning in FOL C . However, reasoning about FOL extended with an arbitrary topology is difficult (or undecidable in general). We would like to reduce the verification problem to pure FOL. One solution is to axiomatize the topology in FOL -this is the approach taken by Ivy [15] . Another approach is to use properties of the topology to reduce reasoning about FO-protocols to FOL. This is similar to the use of topology to reduce reasoning about parameterized finite-state systems to reasoning about finite combinations of finite-state systems in [11] . In the next section, we show how this approach can be extended to FO-protocols.
Verifying FO-Protocols using First Order Logic
In this section, we present a technique for reducing verification of FO-protocols over a given topology C to a decision problem in pure FOL. We assume that we are given a (modular) inductive invariant ∀q · Inv (q) of the form ∀q · Top∈Σ C T Top(q) ⇒ Inv Top (q) . That is, Inv has a local inductive invariant Inv Top(q) for each topological class Top.
Given a First-Order Protocol and candidate invariant, we want to know if |= FOL C InvOk. But deciding this is hard, and so we show that deciding validity of InvOk can be done in pure FOL using modular verification conditions in the style of Owicki-Gries [13] and Paramaterized Compositional Model Checking [11] .
The input to our procedure is a formula Inv Top over signature Σ B ⊎ Σ S for each topological class Top ∈ Σ C T . The VC is a collection of sentences ensuring that for each tuple of processes q in a topological class Top, Inv Top (q) is true initially, is stable under a transition of one process in q, and is stable under interference by any other process p whose execution might affect some q i ∈ q. If the VC is FOL-valid, an inductive invariant has been found. If not, there will be a local violation to inductiveness, which may correspond to a global violation.
Formally, the VC is a collection of statements of the following two forms:
Statements of the first form require that every local neighbourhood of q that satisfies all appropriate initial states also satisfies q's invariant. Statements of the second form capture both transitions where p = q i for some i, or process p acts and modifies q i ∈ nbd(p), since p is quantified universally. All that remains is to formally construct the statements CrossInit , CrossInv . In order to do so, we will construct a characteristic local neighbourhood of a process tuple q. We will want to use a similar construction for both, and so generalize to the characteristic that q must satisfy in addition to other processes given by an arbitrary set A. We will say that formula ψ is a valid candidate for χ Top (A, q) when it is (1) over signature Σ T ∪ Σ E ∪ {=}, (2) contains only terms A ∪ {q i | q i ∈ q}, and (3) is in CNF and all literals from Σ T appear in positive form. Intuitively, we will want to capture when elements of A, q satisfy various topological notions given by signature Σ E ∪ {=}. We also never want to force some processes to be outside of some topological class. We let χ Top (A, q) be the strongest candidate that satisfies |= C ∀q · Top(q) ⇒ χ Top (A, q). Intuitively, χ is a formula that captures all topological knowledge derivable from the topology given that we know that Top(q) holds. For instance, in RBR, we have χ Red (∅, q) = Red(q), while expanding this for A = {left (p), p, right (p)} results in the following formula.
These characteristics are illustrated in Figure 5 . When we just look at χ Red (∅, q), we find q is red. However, if we expand our local reasoning to the characteristic χ Red (Mod (p), q), we find that there are two options given by RBR. One option is p is red, and q = p is optional (dotted lines), while q = left (p), right (p). Alternatively, p is black, and q = p, but q could be left (p), right (p), or neither.
Once we have χ Top (A, q), we can define our statements CrossInit Top , CrossInv Top . First, CrossInit Top (q) is obtained from χ Top (∅, q) by replacing every instance of Top ′ i (q) with Init ′ Top i (q). We build our interference constraints in a similar way. We construct CrossInv Top (q) by modifying χ Top (Mod (p), q). Namely, we obtain CrossInv Top (Mod (p), q) from χ Top (Mod (p), q) by replacing every instance of Top
Example 3. The VC generated by the RBR topology may be partitioned into VC Red and VC Black , each consisting of the statements whose conclusions are Inv Red , Inv In practice, the role of the oracle can be filled by a verification engineer. A description of local neighbourhoods starts by allowing all possible neighbourhoods, and as counter-examples disallowed by the topology occur, a verifier may dismiss local configurations that cannot occur on the topology.
Soundness and Completeness
In this section, we present soundness and relative completeness of our verification procedure from Section 4. Soundness. To show soundness, we present a model-theoretic argument to show that whenever the verification condition from Section 4 is valid in FOL, then the condition InvOk is valid in FOL extended with the given topology C. Theorem 1. Given a FO-protocol P and a local invariant per topological class
Proof. We show that InvOk(Inv ) is valid in FOL C by showing that any pair of FOL C interpretations I and I ′ satisfy V C(Inv ) as FOL interpretations, and this is strong enough to guarantee I ⊕ I ′ |= InvOk (Inv ). Let I, I
′ be F OL C interpretations over some G = (V, E) ∈ C. Then I ⊕ I ′ |= V C(Inv ) because V C(Inv ) is valid and I ⊕ I ′ is an FOL interpretation. We first show that I |= (∀p · Init (p) ⇒ ∀p · Inv (p)). Suppose that I ∀p · Init (p). Let p be an aribtrary tuple in G. (Mod (p), q) . Again by instantiating ∀p · Inv (p) on terms in Mod (p), q, we may obtain that I |= CrossInv (Mod (p), q) . Combined, we have
Intuitively, the correctness of Theorem 1 follows from the fact that any interpretation under FOL C is also an interpretation under FOL, and all preconditions generated for VC are true under FOL C interpretation.
Small model property. Checking validity of universally quantified statements in FOL is in the fragment EPR, and thus we obtain a result saying that we only need to consider models of a given size. This means that a FOL solver needs to only reason about finitely many elements of sort Proc. It further means that topologies such as RBR may be difficult to compile to EPR in Ivy, but our methodology guarantees our verifications will be in EPR.
Theorem 2. If |= V C(Inv ) for all process domains of size at most |Mod (p)|+k, then |= C InvOk(Inv ).
Proof. By contrapositive, suppose C InvOk(Inv ). Then, by Theorem 1, |= V C(Inv ). Let I ⊕ I ′ be a falsifying interpretation. It contains an assignment to Mod (p) and q, or to p that makes at least one statement in V C(Inv ) false. Then, (I ⊕ I ′ )(Mod (p) ∪ q) or I(p) Mod (p), q or p to make some statement in V C unsatisfiable. Then I ⊕ I ′ (Mod (p) ∪ q) or I(p) is also a counter-model to V C(Inv ), but with at most |M od(p)| + k elements of sort Proc.
Relative Completeness. We show that our method is relatively complete for local invariants that satisfy the completability condition. Let ϕ(p) be a formula of the form
Intuitively, ϕ(p) is completable if every interpretation I that satisfies ∀p · ϕ(p) and is consistent with some C-interpretation I G can be extended to a full C-interpretation (not necessarily I G ) that satisfies ∀p · ϕ(p). Formally, ϕ is completable relative to topology C iff for every interpretation I with domain U ⊆ V for G = (V, E) ∈ C with an intended interpretation I G such that (I⊎I G )(U ) |= ∀p · ϕ(p), there exists an interpretation J with domain V s.t. (J ⊎ I G ) |= ∀p · ϕ and I(U ) = J (U ). Furthermore, we need a lemma expressing that the chacteristic formula χ Top (A, q) captures all the information we care about for a given topological neighbourhood of A, q. Lemma 1. If FOL interpretation I of signature Σ C satisfies I |= χ Top (A, q), then there exists a C interpretation J of the same signature with J |= χ Top (A, q) and I |= t i = t j iff J |= t i = t j for terms t i , t j ∈ A ∪ q.
Proof. Let I |= χ Top (A, q). Let ϕ(A, q) be the conjunction of all atomic formulae over the signature {=} and statements ¬Top j (q ′ ) that is true of elements of A, q in interpretation I. If no C interpretation J |= Top(q)∧ϕ(A, q), then we can add the clause ¬ϕ(A, q) to χ Top (A, q), thus strengthening it (this is stronger since I |= Top(q), |= ¬ϕ(A, q), and is true of every interpretation modelling Top(q)). However, this violates the assumptions that χ Top is as strong as possible. Thus, some J |= Top(q) ∧ ϕ(A, q). Note that J already satisfies t i = t j iff I satisfies t i = t j since every statement of =, = is included in ϕ(A, q). Finally, since J is a C interpretation and I ′ |= Top(q), then I ′ |= χ Top (A, q) by definition. ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 3. Given an FO-protocol P , if |= C InvOk(Inv ) and both Inv(p) and Init(p) are completable relative to C, then |= V C(Inv ).
Proof. By contra-positive, we show that given a completable local invariant
is not valid, and let I ⊕ I
′ by such that I ⊕ I ′ |= V C(Inv ). We consider two cases -a violation initially or inductively.
Case 1: Initialization: For some processes p = p 1 , . . . , p k and 1 ≤ i ≤ |Σ C T |, I |= CrossInit Top i (p) and I |= Inv Top i (p). Modify I(Σ T ) for every q so that Top j (q) is interpreted to be true iff Init Top j (q) is true. Noting that all invariants and initial conditions are outside of the signature Σ T , we observe that this is done without loss of generality. Since I |= CrossInit Top i (p), we conclude now that I |= χ ∅,Top i (p). Applying Lemma 1 to I(Σ C ), we get a C interpretation J |= χ Top i (∅, p C ). Since this model has the same equalities of terms p C in J as p in I, we may copy the states 
We extend this to a full model J of signature Σ C ∪Σ S ∪Σ B . We set J ′ (Σ C ) = J (Σ C ). Then, since J and I, and J ′ and I ′ share equalties across terms in Mod (p) ∪ q and Mod (p C ) ∪ q C , we can lift states from terms t ∈ Mod (p)∪q by J (Σ S ∪Σ B )(t C ) I(Σ S ∪Σ B )(t) and J ′ (Σ S )(t C ) I ′ (Σ S )(t). Since Inv is completable, we complete this interpretation with J (Σ S ∪ Σ B ) and clone the completion to
and Mod (p) terms are lifted directly from I and I ′ to J and
, which is the language of invariants. Thus, we have shown that InvOk(Inv ) is falsifiable in FOL C in this case as well.
⊓ ⊔
How restrictive is the requirement of completability? Intuitively, if a protocol is very restrictive about how processes interact, then the system is likely sufficiently intricate that trying to reason locally may be difficult independant of our methodology. For instance, the invariant we later find for leader election is not completable. However, if equivalence classes are small, then most reasonable formulae satisfy the completability condition. 
′ . Then J completes the partial interpretation I.
Theorem 4 can be generalized to the case where the topological kinds Σ T are non-overlapping, and individually completable, where by individually completable, we mean that if Top(p) and process states of p ′ ⊂ p are given, then there is a way to satisfy Inv (p) without changing the states of p ′ .
Example: Leader Election Protocol
In this section, we illustrate our approach by applying it to the well-known leader election protocol [2] . This is essentially the same protocol used to illustrate Ivy in [15] . The goal of the protocol is to choose a leader on a ring. Each process sends messages to its neighbour on one side and receives messages from a neighbour on the other side. Initially, all processes start with distinct identifiers, id , that are totally ordered. Processes pass id s around the ring and declare themselves the leader if they ever receive their own id . We implement this behaviour by providing each process a comparison variable comp. Processes then pass the maximum between id and comp to the next process. A process whose id and comp have the same value is the leader. The desired safety property is that there is never more than one leader in the protocol.
In [15] , the protocol is modelled by a global transition system. The system maintains a bag of messages for each process. At each step, a currently waiting message is selected and processed according to the program of the protocol. The network topology is axiomatized, as shown in Section 1. Here, we present a local model of the protocol and its corresponding verification condition. Network topology. The leader election protocol operates on a ring of size at least 3. For n ≥ 3, let G n = (V n , E n ), where V n = {p n i | 0 ≤ i < n} and
Finally, the network topology is BT W = {G n | n ≥ 3}. Note that while BT W can be axiomatized in FOL, we do not require such an axiomatization. The definition is purely semantic, no theorem prover sees it.
A formal specification of the leader election as an FO-protocol is shown in Fig. 7 , where LO(≤) is an axiomatization of total order from [15] , and x < y stands for x ≤ y∧x = y. The model follows closely the informal description of the protocol given above. The safety property is ¬Bad, where Bad = btw(x, y, z) ∧ id(x) = comp(x) ∧ id(y) = comp(y). That is, a bad state is reached when two processes that participate in the btw relation are both leaders. A local invariant Inv lead based on the invariant from [15] is shown in Fig. 8 . The invariant first says if an id passes from y to x through z, then it must witness id (y) ≥ id (z) to do so. Second, the invariant says that if a process is a leader, then it has a maximum id. Finally, the invariant asserts our safety property.
This invariant was found interactively with Ivy by seeking local violations to the invariant. Our protocol's btw is uninterpreted, while Ivy's btw is explicitly axiomatized. The inductive check assumes that the processes p, next(p), q all satisfy a finite instantiation of the ring axioms (this could be done by the developer as needed if an axiomatization is unknown, and this is guaranteed to terminate as there are finitely many relevant terms), and btw (q). Once the invariants are provided, the check of inductiveness is mechanical. Overall, this presents a natural way to model protocols for engineers that reason locally.
An uncompletable invariant The invariant for the leader election is not completable. To see this, we present a partial interpretation I over {p of network nodes can be encoded and reasoned about separately from FOL based reasoning about safety properties of the reachable states of a parametric family of programs. Using separate decision procedures, one for answering questions about the topology and one for answering questions about local similarity between topological structures, and processes, one can then reason compositionally within an FOL-based theorem prover. We have used the framework to reason about the correctness of a version of the leader election protocol [2] .
We based our description of leader election on that presented in the Ivy framework [15] . The distinction being that the analysis carried out in Ivy [15] is global, while the analysis given in the current paper is local, where the local structures reason about triples of processes in the the ring.
There has been extensive work on proving properties of parametric, distributed protocols. In particular the work in [1] offers an alternative approach to parametric program analysis based on "views". In that work, cut off points are calculated during program analysis. As another example, in [7, 11, 12 ] the "cutoffs" are based on the program topology and the local structural symmetries amongst the nodes of the process interconnection networks.
The notion of a "cutoff" proof of safety for a parametric family of programs was first introduced by [4] . For example, in [4] , if a ring of 3 processes satisfies a parametric property then the property must hold for all rings with at least three nodes. The technique used here is somewhat different; rather than needing to check a ring of 3 processes, we check all pseudo-rings of a given size.
Local symmetry reduction for multi-process networks and parametric families of networks generalizes work on "global" symmetry reduction introduced by [5] and [3] . Local symmetry is, in general, an abstraction technique that can offer exponentially more reduction than global symmetry. In particular, ring structures are globaly rotationally symmetric, but for isomorphic processes may be fully-locally symmetric [11, 12] .
Recent work [17] has focused on modular reasoning in the proof or analysis of distributed systems. In the current work, the modularity in the proof is driven by a natural modularity in the program structures. In particular, for programs of several processes proofs are structured by modules that are local to a neighborhood of one or more processes [7, 11, 12] .
Conclusion
We have presented a framework for specifying protocols in a process-local manner with topology factored out. We show that verification is reducible to FOL with an oracle to answer local questions about the topology. This reduction results in a decidable VC when the background theories are decidable. This cleanly separates the reasoning about the topology from that of the states of the processes.
Many open questions remain. We plan to investigate our methodology on other protocols and topologies, implement oracles for common topologies, and explore complexity of the generated characteristic formulae. Finally, we restricted ourselves to static topologies of bounded degree. Handling dynamic or unbounded topologies, for example in the AODV protocol [10] , is left open.
